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On the 7
th
 of October 2013 the EU added around 350 corpses to the mass grave that it has been piling up in 
the Mediterranean. These needlessly wasted lives speak not only of the EU’s appalling border management. 
They should be taken as a warning of a far wider tragedy unfolding all across the EU. The dead African 
migrants could be thought as potentially dead EU citizens. The disregard for their humanity may be seen as a 
dramatic result of the expanding disrespect for minorities all across the EU. 
In 1951, the EU started as a project intended to breathe life into the injured body of a continent mauled by 
the savagery of nationalistic hubris. The horrid trauma of a landscape filled with doom and the very credible 
threat of its reoccurrence brought statesmen around to the then incredible proposal of surrendering part of 
their sovereignty to a supranational institution (Vernon, 1953:183). ‘No more war’; brandishing this adage 
the bold politicians of that time tried to rally the hearts and minds of a destroyed Europe. Despite its fanciful 
idealism, this conflict resolution mechanism has indeed managed to turn vicious dictatorships and devastated 
nations into one of the most developed regions in the world (UNDP, 2013). By showering wealth on the 
inflaming rhetoric of unscrupulous nationalists, dispassionate technocrats in Brussels have marginalized such 
demagogues to the fringes of political life since World War II (Featherstone, 1994). However, the EU’s 
legitimacy has been eroded by the current crisis, in which new demagogues have found an unprecedented 
opportunity to put forward their disingenuous yet highly evocative appeals for a retreat into nationalism as 
the solution to the self-inflicted economic crisis. A little over six decades after the mayhem from which the 
EU emerged, Europe is again being swayed by an angry political discourse now espoused by increasingly 
powerful political figures such as Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Nigel Farage 
in the UK and Marian Kotleba in Slovakia—among many others of the kind—who appear bound to sweep 
electoral majorities in forthcoming national and EU elections (Economist, 2013b). More worryingly still is 
that in order to court a growing number of increasingly dissatisfied voters, center and even left-wing political 
parties have been engaged in the self-defeating political maneuver of adopting—and thus legitimizing—this 
populist rhetoric of closure, discrimination and xenophobia. 
Paranoia and fear are fuelling the delusion that a dome can be built around the EU, as if the whole polity 
could somehow quarantine itself from the problems of a globalization in which it plays a central role itself. 
EU-phobia is increasingly overshadowing EU-phoria and with it an inside-looking fear is taking over 
outward-looking extroversion. The retreat into nationalism as a solution to the woes of EU members is 
breeding a yearning for a national essence and thus resuscitating dangerous anxieties for the loss of cultural 
and racial homogeneity (Spire, 2013). Promoting policies aimed at keeping foreign influences at bay finds its 
most concrete political expression in the bodies of migrants. We argue here that the border regime in the 
Mediterranean is inextricably bound to the future of the EU. Beyond exposing the hypocrisy of a Union that 
derives great diplomatic strength from its supposed exaltation of human rights (Manners, 2002:240-252), the 
deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean threaten the very foundations upon which the EU rests. Those who 
believe that the demise of migrants in the Mediterranean is a calamity that stops at the boundaries of the EU 
fool themselves. The souls of the migrants drowned in its waters not only decry an inhumane border regime 
but haunt the very soul of a political project that derives a great deal of its legitimacy from the prevention of 
such atrocities (Schuman, 1950). 
What used to be unspeakable anxieties over purification have become the battle cry of xenophobic, racist and 
EU-skeptic political movements across the EU. Their bitter rhetoric of deportations, detention camps, 
militarized borders and harassing immigration regimes is becoming not only publicly acceptable, but 
mainstream in the public debate of both member states and the EU. The overall grand strategy of these 
tactics is a retreat from openness and an entrenchment in nationalism. An enthusiasm for diversity is being 
replaced by an ever-deeper fear of what may be coming from beyond either national or the EU’s external 
borders. Unscrupulous politicians motivated by the expected reward of political prominence are showing no 
qualms in going to the basement of their intentions to dust the blunt tools of inflammatory speech. Their 
solutions to highly complex problems rely on primitive oversimplifications that end up blaming what 
historically have been the most exploitable scapegoats in times of hardness: vulnerable minorities with poor 
political representation. For all these opportunistic politicians care, society may be ripped apart if this is what 
it takes for them to reap the political success they crave. 
The EU is manifesting a museum-like mentality that seems to suggest that Europe can only be saved by 
submitting itself to a glorious taxidermy driven by the ruinous desire to entrench in autarkic nationalisms. As 
if preserving an inexistent essential nation in the alchemical formol of timelessness was a better alternative 
than exposing it to the vicissitudes of flows and the naturally unavoidable changes they bring about. It’s a 
self-destructive scheme that advocates the dereliction of the EU in order to keep it pure and homogenous. 
Afflicted by this ‘border disorder’, the EU keeps confining itself to a special sanctuary while assigning 
migrants the status of intruders, as if Europeans were a special species on this planet and immigrants a lower 
life form. This is a dangerous mentality leading to more—not less—panic and fear (van Houtum & Pijpers, 
2007; Van Houtum 2010). The EU is biting its own tail blinded by the delusion that tearing itself apart is the 
answer to its anxieties. For, how can the EU expect to undermine the new nationalism that feeds populist 
anti-EU parties by feeding their very rhetoric with more fear of migrants? And how can the EU boast about 
being a staunch promoter of human rights—that by definition have a universal application—while turning a 
blind eye to thousands of preventable and needless deaths in the Mediterranean? 
By undermining the scope of the universal rights it is supposed to promote, the EU weakens not only the 
rights of migrants that should be the subject of its protection but also the rights of its own citizens and the 
cohesion of its own populations. The violent migratory policies along the Mediterranean stigmatize local 
immigrant communities in EU member states and justify fear against them. This in turn breeds resentment 
among local immigrant communities—many of whose members hold EU passports—towards their own 
national state and the EU, whom they see badmouthing and tarnishing people similar to them. It is not 
difficult to see how this antagonism places serious obstacles in the way of integration, divides society and 
weakens emotional affiliations to national polities and their supranational container (i.e., the EU). One 
cannot condemn African migrants without expecting the fallout to affect EU citizens of African descent and 
the perceptions that their fellow citizens harbor about them. Moreover, the progressive mistreatment of these 
vulnerable minorities gently paves the way for the persecution of vulnerable minorities of EU citizens, such 
as Muslims (Bunzl, 2005), homosexuals, Chinese, Roma (Gezer, 2013), intra-communitarian migrants (ICF 
GHK & Milieu Ltd., 2013) and Jews (Than, 2013). 
By flying on the wings of nationalism and xenophobia, the EU’s border policies undermine the very foreign 
policy tools that could bolster the kind of reforms that would make illegal immigration less attractive for 
people in search of better lives. As a consequence of these processes, the current immoral borderline politics 
of the EU may at some point explode into violence against the EU itself and against newcomers, 
paradoxically detonated by an EU-skepticism of the EU’s own making. 
If the EU wants to prosper it needs to keep true to the conditionality-driven conflict resolution model that has 
created wealth for the countries it has come to engulf. It needs to offer money, increased mobility and access 
to its markets in exchange for reforms, especially now that the countries where autocracies have fallen or 
look feeble are more open to its influence. It needs to liberalize its agricultural markets to the North African 
countries and offer increased mobility to their most ambitious people—which does not necessarily mean the 
highly qualified. By improving the sometimes deplorable conditions that immigrants heading for the EU 
righteously try to escape from, the EU would create not only a far-sighted border regime but also one whose 
justice matched the rhetoric of human rights the EU prides itself on protecting. Moreover, this would come 
with the advantage of smothering the inflammatory rhetoric of xenophobic, populist, anti-EU political 
predators that threaten the Union’s prosperity and very existence. 
The idea that the EU has about how best to deal with migration-related issues betrays a conception of 
migrants as useless and obscures the magnitude and multiple dimensions of the problem. Why do the 
Odyssey-like journeys of migrants deserve a response of scorn and fear rather than applause and praise? 
Who are the beneficiaries of geopolitical narratives that turn potentially good citizens and chronic tax-payers 
into criminal fiends and cultural villains? We are talking about detention camps for people who are in search 
of a better life. They are not the parasites feeding on public services that xenophobic groups depict them to 
be but often they are able-bodied young people most of whom would be more than glad to work if given the 
opportunity (Eurostat, 2013). The problem is of substance, not of degree. The substance is that migration is 
not a problem to be dealt with but an innate human inclination that any liberal democracy would benefit from 
fully integrating to its regime of rights and obligations. Migration is a tireless brush endlessly retouching the 
picture of society and its strokes need to be gently led rather than destructively deflected. A painting is going 
to result anyway, but it is up to governments to create either joyful landscapes or something resembling 
Goya’s macabre prints. Migrants cannot be blamed for doing what humans have always done when faced 
with the legitimate desire to travel, especially when this reason is the powerful drive to escape a cruel 
adversity they have never had any means of influencing (Schapendonk, 2012). EU citizens are no different in 
this respect.  Multitudes of them are embarking for other continents in search for better lives as result of the 
economic crisis (Economist, 2013a). Migrants need to be given a fair chance and their rights and plights need 
to be assessed in a lawful and dignified way, which means not only fully abiding by refugee law but also 
finding ways to make turn their ambitions of residence and citizenship into advantageous policies for the 
recipient polity. Chasing migrants and locking them in cages or leaving them to drown is inhumane and 
shameful, as well as a waste of civic and economic progress for the EU itself. 
So, the idealism of nomadism and unsettledness upon which the EU has built its wealth needs to be rescued 
from the Mediterranean waters. Let the catastrophe seen in the Mediterranean be the turning point for this. 
‘No more human suffering in the Mediterranean’. That should be the adage of a reinvigorated EU. If Europe 
is to be snatched from the claws of xenophobic nationalism, the EU should stop feeding into it and come up 
with a new grand idea for the continent. How has the EU lost the spirit of freedom, enlightenment and 
openness that drove its success? Why is the once romantic dream of a united Europe steadily acquiring the 
anguishing undertones of a disturbing flashback? Where are the Monnets and Schumans of our time? Where 
are the long-term political visionaries laying out the grand schemes for a future prosperous Europe? 
The EU should dare to take a look back at its origins and embrace the bold naivety it once had. No little task; 
but it’s a colossally smaller step compared to founding the EU in a postwar nationalistic landscape. The mass 
grave in the Mediterranean is a shameful remembrance of the mass graves out of which the EU’s own 
existence came. Perhaps as the best way to appraise the significance of its border disorder, the EU needs to 
realize that both its external and internal borders are just different levels of the same political theatre. The 
dramas playing out along the external borders reverberate in the development of the plot across the internal 
borders. Closing the mass grave of the Mediterranean is a moderate measure compared to the gasping 
calamity that the disintegration of the EU would mean for the world of each of its citizens. 
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